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Abstract 
The opposition between fundamentalism and deliberative democracy is basic to the 
argument of this article. In the following we shall take our point of departure in a 
procedural understanding of fundamentalism that enables us to see how different 
substantive values might turn out to be fundamentalist. Any form of communication 
that obstructs possible change of preferences might be fundamentalist. The decisive 
criterion is thus not to point out particular forms of communication as 
fundamentalist or deliberative per se; the decisive criterion is how the 
communication works.  
Based on our procedural understanding of fundamentalism we move on to argue in 
favour of a value pluralism that is basic to deliberative democracy. This pluralism is 
then contrasted to both fundamentalism and relativism. In order to establish value 
pluralism there is a need for judgment of particular norms and values – as opposed 
to merely understanding of the differences. Hence, it is argued that value pluralism 
requires substantive judgment of the differences. The arguments partly draw upon 
Jürgen Habermas’ idea of unconstrained discourse and Charles Taylor’s discussion 
of politics of recognition, along with Immanuel Kant’s concept of reflective 
judgment, or enlarged thought, in his third critique. In order to make legitimate 
judgments of particular norms and values we need to judge from the perspective of 
everyone else. 
The latter part of the article discusses how online contexts of communication 
contribute to global communication and deliberative democracy. Online polling, 
blogs and storytelling are forms of communication that may, under certain 
circumstances, make substantial contributions. James Fishkin’s idea of deliberative 
polling online and Robert Cavalier’s PICOLA project are discussed. In concluding it 
is argued that the virtual realities that are available online might be even more 
important than the democratic procedures per se in realising more enlarged 
thought and global democracy worldwide. Hence, global communication online 
might, under certain circumstances, work as an impediment against fundamentalist 
knowledge offline. 
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Introduction 
Fundamentalism as applied in media is often used as a label of certain kinds of 
behaviour that is internally linked to religion. Standard cases of reference are, 
among others, Moslem reactions towards ironic cartoons in Western media of the 
prophet Mohammed; religious minorities who refuse to subordinate to the majority 
culture of society, eg the request to be free to exercise religious practises without 
interruption from the majority society; terrorist actions in the name of the religious 
conviction that harm done towards Moslem religious culture should be revenged 
(like September 11). 
Many people relate fundamentalism to religion, in particular Islam, as a contrast to 
Western, democratic and liberal values. Against this background it is possible to 
establish a cultural division line between fundamentalist and democratic values, 
based on the degree to which religion is considered to be turned into politics or not. 
This is unlucky because we get loss of an important point that I shall argue for: also 
Western liberal ‘values’ might appear as highly fundamentalist. So how should we 
delineate fundamentalism? I shall argue that fundamentalism ought to be conceived 
of in procedural terms. The focus is then shifted from specific (substantive) values 
to the way values are being treated. Whether we are presented with a morally 
problematic kind of fundamentalism depends on whether there is an argumentative 
disclosure for counter-arguments. We might thus ask: is it possible to argue against 
a particular cultural norm? Is it open to revision? Can it be refuted? A negative 
answer to these questions points in the direction of what is here defined as 
procedural fundamentalism. Such fundamentalism does not allow for counter-
arguments, revision or refusal of contested norms. This is exactly the reason why it 
is relevant to criticise a fundamentalist position. 
In several other contexts I have distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate 
paternalism based on procedural criteria for defining paternalism (Thorseth 
1999:75-80). We shall have a brief look at paternalism as it relates to 
fundamentalism in a certain sense. Paternalism means enforcement against 
someone’s freedom for the benefit of that individual, and it might on many 
occasions be morally legitimate. Parents’ upbringing and education of their own 
children is an obvious case in question. Not every kind of parental upbringing is, 
however, an example of paternalistic enforcement. This is the case when it is 
contested whether the practice in question actually is for the benefit of the child. 
Forced marriage is a case that fits in here. Some instances of forced marriage are 
obviously fundamentalist, which should not be confused with the institution of 
arranged marriages as such, as arranged marriages are embraced by many Moslem 
women because they believe it is for their own best interests. In these cases it 
cannot be claimed that the institution of arranged marriage is paternalist, either, 
because it is not connected to enforcement. Arranged marriage as such is neither 
fundamentalist nor paternalist. Still, this norm is often associated with 
fundamentalist religious values. This is both unlucky and unwarranted. 
The procedural relation between fundamentalism and paternalism underlies the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate paternalism. The latter implies that 
those who exercise paternalism are not receptive to counter-arguments, hence, 
they behave in a fundamentalist way. Such procedural paternalism is here defined 
as illegitimate paternalism, and it creates problems in modern, multicultural 
societies. The problem is often a consequence of migration which tends to create 
and also require change of religious values. Migration is not, however, the only 
reason why this problem arises. Cultural changes within most modern societies 
often lead to contests about many traditional norms and practises. This, in its turn 
requires of many people that they have to undertake profound choices with respect 
to questions of belief and religious belonging. Such choices do not only concern 
relations of belonging. Borders are moved or changed due to migration. The 
orthodox Moslem suddenly belongs to a different society when she is in Norway as 
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compared to the countryside back home in Pakistan. In order to act autonomously 
it is a precondition that one is a member of the society by which one is surrounded. 
Freedom of religion requires a real possibility of choice of faith, but also a possibility 
to criticise, revise or sometimes even to give up one’s former religious belief. 
Fundamentalism might be expressed by way of attempts to hinder this possibility. 
If such fundamentalism is paternalist it is by the same token also illegitimate. 
 
Part I 
Fundamentalism – A Procedural Approach  
The Moslem fundamentalist, who wants to be recognised for her own non-
argumentative behaviour towards contested norms, renders herself guilty of 
inconsistency. This is because the claim to non-interference already presupposes 
argumentative participation. The struggle for recognition of fundamentalist 
behaviour (for instance, the banning of Western values) is equivalent to demanding 
respect for criticising these values. Refusal to state one's reasons for withdrawal 
from discourse, while still claiming a right to be respected for oppressive behaviour 
towards group members, is an example of non-argumentative fundamentalism. 
Such fundamentalism is characterised by argumentative closure, as opposed to 
practical discourse which is associated with argumentative disclosure  (Habermas 
1990). The morally relevant distinction between argumentative closure and 
disclosure is procedural. Fundamentalism as described above might be present 
within any form of life, characterised by a refusal to engage in critical reflection of 
any particular form of life that has become contested. This is also an argument 
against the belief that enforced argumentation is just another kind of 
fundamentalism. 
 
‘Traditional’ and ‘modern’ fundamentalism: Introductory examples 
(i) Fundamentalism as rational behaviour 
According to Karl-Otto Apel, the increasing fundamentalism within Islam might be 
considered a reaction towards the fear of negative influence from the West 
(Thorseth 1994:6). In his opinion this is a normal reaction towards much of the bad 
rhetoric that most people hear about the West. As a result, religion is turned into 
an argument against Western, secular influence. This might be reflected either in 
refusal to argue or in preventing others within their own group from arguing about 
contested norms. Fundamentalism in this case consists in a refusal to argue about 
(contested) religious norms. 
The problem that I want to emphasise is that the fundamentalist refuses to argue 
even if the contested norm in question has been exposed to public opinion, by 
being contested within the public sphere. The important question is whether it 
ought to make a difference if the contested norm in question is about religion as 
compared to democratic values. I shall argue that global democracy ought to be 
preferred to competing systems of communication. In order to do so it is necessary 
to draw a demarcation line between the communicative procedures of 
fundamentalism as opposed to democracy. In the following we shall have a brief 
look at some examples of procedural fundamentalism. 
 
(ii) Fundamentalism and essentialism 
Essentialism is mainly linked to identity. Essentialism is an example of 
fundamentalism because it is regarded as if certain norms and values were beyond 
revision, for whatever reason (for instance, the aim of preservation of a particular 
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form of life). Thus, essentialism becomes one among several kinds of 
fundamentalism, as there are other kinds of fundamentalism which do not 
particularly relate to identity. The main characteristic of the essentialist 
fundamentalist, then, is the belief in some non-dialogical or static identity, often 
attached to ethnicity. The Indian parents who arrange their daughters’ marriages 
(against the daughter’s will) fit into this category. The same holds true for the 
‘modern’ nationalist who wants to preserve a white Swedish majority of a future 
Sweden, as well. A third example is one that is discussed by K. Anthony Appiah 
(1994:154-5). It concerns the Afro-American nationalists who claim recognition for 
a particular black identity that they want to preserve, while not recognising that 
this very identity is made up within the white majority. People who react negatively 
towards Samis who enter MacDonald’s dressed in traditional Sami clothes might 
also fit into this category of essentialism. The common denominator in all these 
examples is the non-argumentative conceptualisation of some particular (group) 
identity, regarded to be beyond revision and critical reflection. 
 
(iii) ‘Fundamentalism in disguise’ 
The fundamentalists in (i) and (ii) might be considered to be ‘overt’ 
fundamentalists, i e they do not pretend to behave in a non-fundamentalist way; 
they act more or less strategically in order to realise some particular goal. A 
different kind of fundamentalist is the one who objects to fundamentalism (i) and 
(ii), while withdrawing some of her own beliefs from critical reflection. The dogmatic 
Western feminist who criticises the Moslem fundamentalist might be a case in 
question, if she does not allow any critical objection towards feminism from the 
fundamentalist Moslem. There are two points I want to make in connection with this 
example: (1) the feminist and the Moslem are both fundamentalists about some 
particular values. (2) They both behave non-argumentatively about some values 
they take to be beyond criticism. Another example demonstrating this scenario was 
a world conference among female activists discussing prostitution. None of the 
prostitutes who were present were allowed to engage in the discussion, probably 
because it was thought that they might propose ideas in favour of prostitution.1 The 
unwillingness to accept African women’s objections to accusations about being 
oppressed is another case in question. 
A common denominator in these examples is the subordination of all arguments 
under one perspective, along with the raising of some particular norm or 
perspective that is taken to be beyond critical reflection or dialogical 
argumentation. The ‘modern’ fundamentalism does not differ from ‘traditional’ 
religious fundamentalism as far as structural or procedural characteristics are 
concerned. Still, the ‘modern’ fundamentalist pretends to be non-fundamentalist 
and thus rational, as opposed to ‘traditional’ fundamentalists. This is why I describe 
the ‘modern’ fundamentalist as a ‘fundamentalist in disguise’. In order to identify 
the morally relevant features of fundamentalism, I think it is important to realise 
that fundamentalism and rationality are not the essential opposites in 
characterising the difference between the Moslem and feminist fundamentalists in 
the preceding example.  
These instances of fundamentalism demonstrate several interesting differences. For 
my purpose it is, however, the common denominators that are of main concern: 
First, there is the subordination of all criticism under one perspective, and second 
there is the withdrawal of some particular norm (religion, belief system, ideology 
etc.) from critical reflection. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ringdal, Nils Johan, Verdens vanskeligste yrke. De prstituertes verdenshistorie (Oslo: Cappelen. 1997) 
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Fundamentalism in media: the Fadime case 
Fundamentalism might be conceived as suppression of challenges of particularity, 
as when a particular cultural practice or a story that is put forth with a claim to 
approval without questioning. To make this concrete, we shall take our point of 
departure in a particular story from the Nordic media. In January 2002 Swedish-
Kurd Fadime was killed by her father in Sweden. The reason why she was killed was 
that she had a Swedish boyfriend. The murder was referred to in the media as a 
murder of honour, and it was seen as an expression of conflict over the cultural 
norm of forced marriage, a norm that is extensive in many Moslem societies. The 
murder and the debate following from it have necessitated a public reflection about 
a claim to participate in the public debate, and also about the practice to refer to 
immigrants in terms of representative groups. Immigrants are often conceived as 
groups in the light of ethnicity, culture and identity. Additionally, these ‘groups’ are 
considered to be represented by their leaders in accordance with Western, 
democratic principles. The contested practises of forced marriage and murder of 
honour do, however, separate the members within the minority societies just as 
well as separating minority groups and the society at large.  
The murder of Fadime and the debate in Sweden and Norway following from it 
clearly demonstrate that Moslems in these two countries cannot and should not be 
defined on the basis of a uniform group concept. Fadime was killed by her father 
because she loved a Swedish man, and because she spoke her opinions of love and 
marriage openly in the media. She argued against arranged marriages, in favour of 
the right to choose a partner of one´s own. We might formulate this case as a 
problem concerning the relation between the particular and the general, in cases 
where particular arguments are considered to be justified with respect to ‘the 
others’, whereas not looked upon as acceptable ‘for us’.  We may ask: what is it 
that appeals to general circumstances, and how do these appeals relate to 
something beyond the particular, something of universal scope?  
We may further ask how to describe the case above, what description is the correct 
one? No matter how we describe it – as an act of murder of honour or something 
else – our description will on any occasion be a normative act. This is because we 
look for solutions to the problems that we raise. This act is either a murder of 
honour – Fadime’s father wanted to rescue the family’s honour – or it was about a 
sick man’s misdeed as Fadime’s sister Fidan claimed (Eriksen and Wadel 2002).  
In describing this act as a murder of honour a particular appeal is thereby made to 
particular circumstances about a particular culture. As a result, the description 
might easily be exploited for both criticism, but also for justification of murder of 
honour, as was done by Shabana Rehman and the imams respectively, in the 
Norwegian debate succeeding this act.2 Whether this particular description is used 
for criticism or justification, it will in both cases encourage segregation. To describe 
the same act as the misdeed of a sick man, as Fadime’s family did, does not, 
however, appeal to culturally specific circumstances to the same extent as the 
concept ‘murder of honour’ does. The fact that some people commit sick acts 
because they do not function well in society might be affect anyone, and it is not 
necessarily related to ethnic or cultural status in particular. The appeal to culturally 
specific circumstances is part of the fundamentalism that is exercised in this case. 
The culturally specific appeal does not, however, necessarily imply a case of 
fundamentalism, provided that the specific appeal also includes a more general 
appeal that transcends the particular circumstances (Dryzek 2000:57-80).3 
                                                 
2 Shabana Rehman – a Norwegian woman brought up in Norway by her Pakistani parents - is an eager 
discussant in Norwegian media on topics concerning multicultural affairs, in particular on religious 
suppression of women.  
3 Dryzek here discusses deliberation in view of two different tests: (i) communication that involves 
coercion should be excluded, and (ii) communication that cannot connect the particular to the general 
should be excluded. 
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If the act in question is considered as a sick person’s misdeed, it is turned into 
something that calls for a more general appeal. By contrast, if the act is described 
in terms of a particular cultural or religious norm of a particular society cannot be 
defended by many. The justification by appeal to the particular endangers by 
mobilising disgust within the society at large. Further, I believe that the particular 
appeal, as an example of procedural fundamentalism, might enforce a kind of 
culture relativism that weakens minorities as well as the society at large. Ethical 
argumentation in a global world should instead strengthen minorities as well as 
majority. One means of contributing in this direction is to avoid particular appeals 
devoid of a universal component. A relativist defence of particular appeals is thus 
not available. 
What we need to establish in order to avoid particular appeals being turned into 
fundamentalism, is to establish a link to a universal appeal that transcends what is 
embedded in the particular or culturally specific norm or practice. What we should 
aim at establishing is a mutual respect for each other’s circumstances. Misdeeds as 
such transcend culturally embedded norms, whereas culturally defined misdeeds 
are embedded in particular cultures, and hence specific. 
In this paper it is argued that we need to distinguish between different kinds of 
fundamentalism, the primary aim being to disconnect the conceptual linkage 
between religion and fundamentalism. Rather, our focus is to better understand the 
procedural features of fundamentalism. A distinction has been made between 
legitimate and illegitimate paternalism. Fundamentalism is here characterised in 
terms of procedural traits of communication rather than by its particular content, 
such that any values might appear to be fundamentalist, whether they relate to 
religion, gender, sex, ethnicity or others. The Fadime case illustrates how 
argumentation might be characterised as fundamentalist by making a particular 
appeal to something that cannot be shared by everyone. 
  
Value pluralism and judgment 
The position we want to defend is a criticism of both procedural fundamentalism 
and relativism. Part of the problem about moral relativism is the envisaging of a 
normative position that is exempted from moral judgment. This is the case if we 
believe that we can coherently understand without judging, for instance practices 
that many people strongly disapprove of, like female mutilation or women being 
banned from education or employment outside the home, or ethnic cleansing. 
Rather than taking a relativist stance we should argue in favour of value pluralism. 
According to the latter: 
− Conflicting goods might both be valuable. 
− We should recognise and respect other cultures. 
− Recognition requires substantive judgment and not only formal or epistemic 
judgment. 
As an example of value pluralism, we could consistently hold both that ‘community 
cohesion matters morally’ which is more true of many Eastern societies than of 
Western societies, and at the same time we may hold that ‘individual freedom 
matters morally’ which comes closer to Western ideology than to Eastern ideology.4 
A basic requirement is, however, that there is a limit as to what should be 
tolerated. Among these are certainly any instances of abuses of human rights. 
According to this interpretation of value pluralism we do not have to commit 
ourselves to moral relativism. While undertaking a substantive judgment we 
thereby show respect for those with whom we disagree, by being willing to get into 
                                                 
4 I owe this example to Levy (2002), chapter 8.  
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argumentation with them. The examples of contested practices mentioned above 
are objectionable from a human rights perspective, and it can hardly be argued that 
we show respect for the plurality of opinions if we just leave such examples 
unquestioned. The relativist solution would be to leave it exactly there, making an 
appeal to the claim that moral judgments are only relative to some standard of 
framework. The important and difficult question to be treated is whether it would be 
legitimate to interfere with such condemnable practices. If we choose not to 
interfere even if we strongly condemn human rights abuses, it is tantamount to 
stating that these acts are right because they are permissible by the moral 
standards of the people who perform them. This position is hard to defend in a 
world where we are continuously reminded that conflicting norms are not only 
relative to particular cultures; in fact, conflicting norms and moral conflicts prevail 
as much within as between cultures. This is essential to the question whether non-
interference demonstrates recognition and respect. 
Above it is indicated that interference is associated with substantive judgment as 
opposed to merely formal judgment, and hence it also demonstrates involvement 
with the individuals or culture in question. Non-interference is more closely linked 
to a policy of neutrality which should not necessarily be identified with recognition 
and respect. Abstaining from substantive judgment is dangerous because it leaves 
the floor open to fundamentalism.  
It is important to the argument of this chapter to establish that global democracy 
runs contrary to any form of fundamentalism. This follows from the procedural 
criterion that has been discussed above. Additionally, it is equally important that 
global democracy implies judging as opposed to merely understanding. This is 
contained in the concept of value pluralism discussed above. A third criterion for 
excluding fundamentalism is that our judgments of different moral systems are not 
purely formal. This last criterion is inherent in the claim that purely formal 
judgments which are characteristic of moral relativism are insufficient with respect 
to value pluralism. A preliminary conclusion, then, is that global democracy would 
require a value pluralism that rules out some moral systems due to 
fundamentalism. Non-fundamentalist communication calls for intervention 
whenever basic human rights are jeopardised. The universal status of human rights 
is rooted in both a legal and a moral notion of value pluralism. The Kantian notions 
of humanity and enlarged thought are basic to our understanding of what 
legitimises a universal appeal of particular judgments. In the next paragraph we 
will explore the Kantian notion of reflective judgment. 
 
Reflective judgment of the particular  
From the arguments above we will, as a start, highlight the following points: 
− Putting all values on the same par shows disrespect for the differences, and 
it undermines value pluralism. 
− Attributing significance to particular values is a dialogical enterprise that 
cannot be purely formal. 
− Hence, value pluralism requires substantive judgment of the differences. 
The standard by which we make moral judgments is not only substantive as 
opposed to purely formal. Additionally we also need a standard for criticising norms 
and practices that we find intolerable and dehumanising. Different solutions have 
been suggested, among them, some common standard of rationality that applies in 
particular to the public domain. John Rawls is an exponent of this solution, 
especially by his concept of ‘the veil of ignorance’ behind which people rationally 
choose the institutions that neither advantage nor disadvantage anyone (Rawls 
1970). An obvious problem about such a solution is that it is deeply rooted in 
Western standards of rationality due, among other factors, to the strong weight 
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that is put on individual autonomy. In many Eastern countries collectivism is 
embraced to a large extent, and it is conceived as partly incompatible with Western 
individualism (Madsen and Strong 2003). Charles Taylor’s position can be seen as a 
solution to the problem of reconciling differences among ethical systems: 
 
The crucial idea is that people can bond not in spite of but because of difference. 
They can sense, that is, that their lives are narrower and less full alone than in 
association with each other. In this sense, the difference defines a complementarity 
(Taylor 2002 cited in Madsen and Strong 2003:11). 
 
This does not preclude criticism of moral systems, instead, it requires, for the 
criticism to be valid, that it is predicated on a broad understanding of what the 
practices mean in their context (Madsen and Strong 2003:11). In order to have 
knowledge of the practices of alien cultures it is necessary to have access to the 
particular contexts in question. Online communication appears to be a valuable 
means of getting such access. The main reason why, is the unique possibility of this 
medium for communication worldwide (Coleman and Gøtze 2004; Fishkin 1997; 
Wheeler 2005; Thorseth 2006). 
If we view pluralism in light of Taylor’s politics of recognition, where identity is seen 
as fundamentally dialogically established and developed, any recognition will be 
dependent upon the dialogues that constitute the different identities. Following this 
line of thought, we may now see that judgments of others at the same time require 
participation by persons who undertake the judgments, due to the relationship 
which is thereby established to those we are judging. This way of reasoning is also 
reflected in Stanley Cavell’s understanding of how we could criticise for instance the 
institution of slavery without dehumanising: 
 
[W]hat a man who sees certain others as slaves is missing is not something about 
slaves exactly and not exactly about human beings. He is missing something about 
himself, or rather something about his connection with these people, his internal 
relation with them, so to speak (Cavell 1997:377, cited in Madsen and Strong 
2003:13). 
 
The important point to draw from this, and which is also consistent with the 
remaining arguments above, is that value pluralism requires admission of a 
relationship with the others in relation to whom we define our identity. What is at 
stake is not so much how we judge different others, but rather how we could allow 
others to see us. Value pluralism is then envisaged as a system where the most 
important enterprise would be to gain recognition of oneself. 
Now we would like to point out how this recognition of oneself links to Kant’s 
concept of the moral law. In the second critique we find several formulations of the 
categorical imperative: to treat everyone else not merely as a means but also 
always as an end in herself, and to consider the humanity in every single person as 
equally worthy of the same kind of respect.5 In Kant’s third critique he speaks of 
reflective judgment or enlarged thought (Kant 1952 [1790]:§ 40). This concept 
contains a visualisation of how particular judgments gain legitimacy through a kind 
of universal appeal.  
In Kant’s conceptual scheme judgments are of two different kinds: either they are 
determinant, as when something particular is subsumed under universal laws, or, 
by contrast, ‘[i]f only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, 
                                                 
5 ’Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means’, (Kant 1981 [1785]:36). 
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then the judgment is simply reflective’ (Kant 1952 [1790], Introduction IV: 18). 
The purpose of reflective judgment is not to determine anything; rather, it is to 
give itself a law. Hence, validity is gained through reflection of something particular 
as opposed to subsuming something under universal laws. This is partly because 
judgment, which is the topic of investigation in his third critique, is about empirical 
contingencies and not about universal laws of nature or final ends of freedom.6 
Kant’s own focal point in his treatment of judgment is taste and the sublime, and 
applies first and foremost to the aesthetic domain, as distinguished from nature 
(pure reason) and freedom (practical reason). Hannah Arendt and Sheyla Benhabib 
have, however, extended the reflective judgment to the public and political 
faculties, as well (Arendt 1968; Benhabib 1992).  
The validity of judgments depends on the judging, and it is not valid for those who 
do not judge. This point is made by Hanna Arendt, in emphasising that the claim to 
validity presupposes communication between self and others. Hence, a judgment’s 
claim to validity can never extend further than the public realm of those who are 
members of it (Arendt 1968:221). There are in particular two aspects concerning 
validity that should be noted here. One concerns the relation between the particular 
and the universal, whereas the other has to do with the public aspect of judgment. 
Any particular judgment is based in contingent and finite appeals that nevertheless 
may transcend the subjective conditions of the particular judgment. The potential 
for transcending the purely subjective condition is due to the communicative aspect 
of all judgments. Reflective judgment has to do with public – as opposed to private 
– use of reason.  
The basic point is that communication rather than expression is required in public 
reason. Part of this claim on freedom to make public use of reason builds on the 
maxims of common understanding: (1) to think for oneself, (2) to think from the 
standpoint of everyone else, ie enlarged thought and (3 always to think consistently 
(Kant 1952 [1790] § 40:294). The first is the maxim of understanding; the second 
the maxim of judging, and the third the maxim of reason. All of these maxims of 
public reason are more profound than any other use of reason, and they are 
standards for reasoning for addressing ‘the world at large’ (O’Neill 1989:48).  
In addressing the world at large reason accepts no external authority. It is this use 
of reason that is at work in judgment of particular situations, derived from the 
human capacity for reflective judgment. Thus, we see how reflective judgment and 
enlarged thinking in Kant is basic to any other form of communication. This is the 
important point to be drawn from his model for validation in the public faculty, and 
it is particularly interesting because it gives an account of how reflection of 
particular situations and conditions can make a claim to validity. This holds true as 
far as the appeals put forth address a universal audience. By contrast, addressing 
only a restricted audience cannot make claim to something which is universally 
communicable. Still, private uses of reason may be legitimate for certain purposes. 
The important point to be made is that ‘[t]here are no good reasons for tolerating 
any private uses of reason that damage public uses of reason’ (O’Neill 1989:49). 
Non-fundamentalist value pluralism has to steer the course between relativism on 
the one hand, and dogmatic fundamentalism conceived as private use of reason on 
the other. This position must demonstrate recognition of (substantive) differences, 
while also making an appeal to some moral claims that are non-relativistic ally true.  
The distinction between formal and substantive judgment is of uttermost 
importance to the argument of this paper. What we want to establish is on the one 
hand that fundamentalism is defined on the basis of procedural rather than 
substantive criteria; on the other hand, we must also avoid relativism. Thus, 
relativism might turn out to be an example of fundamentalism by evading judgment 
                                                 
6 Judgment is one among three cognitive faculties, the other two being understanding and reason, the 
subject of the first and second of his critiques, respectively. 
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or substantive criticism. In a world of (multi)cultural conflicts we need to be able to 
distinguish between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable behaviour and 
moral systems. For this purpose, Kant’s concepts of enlarged thought and public 
use of reason are helpful. 
Part II  
Online contexts of global communication 
The approach to global communication is here closely linked to the idea of 
deliberative democracy. The global aspect is contained in the vision of 
communication that transcends borders of all kinds, not least geographical, 
whereas the deliberative aspect might best be conceived as direct communication 
aiming at qualifying and possibly changing arguments and opinions in the public 
domain. The outcome of deliberation might be a change of preferences and 
opinions, due to access of opposing views of the matters discussed. In the following 
paragraphs we shall have a brief look at some projects aiming at deliberation in the 
sense just described. Deliberation has on some occasions been carried out as a 
controlled trial ahead of elections, like the PICOLA project in the USA.7 The theory 
underlying this project is labelled deliberative polling which has been developed by 
James Fishkin.8 This issue of online polling is also discussed by Coleman & Gøtze 
(2004), and by Dag Elgesem (2005). 
 
Online deliberation and Democracy Unbound 
My piece of work in the project Democracy Unbound partly deals with online 
communication, and the question of feasibility of global communication – or 
worldwide deliberation – across boundaries, across stereotypes of which 
fundamentalism is an example. My philosophical interest relates to public use of 
reason online. As yet, there are no conclusive reports supporting the assumptions 
that communication online moves in a more democratic and unbound direction. As 
we shall see, there are reports underpinning the democratic and borderless 
potential of this new technology (Wheeler: 2005) and Coleman and Gøtze: 2004)), 
but there are also reports of the opposite (Sunstein 2001). Rather than discussing 
these opposing reports in any detail, I shall focus on the kind of communication 
that is contrasted to fundamentalism. A main objective is to demonstrate why 
online communication might work as an impediment against procedural 
fundamentalism. 
 
Deliberative democracy 
There are different notions of democracy, some of which are more demanding than 
others, eg regarding the participation and influence of the citizens. Democracy 
might be representative or direct, and the scope may vary (local, national or 
federal, supranational, global). The most basic characteristic is, however, the 
plurality of voices upon which opinions and decisions are based. How should we 
make sure that policies pay attention to the plurality of parties concerned, and how 
should we safeguard the procedures at work? Within the Democracy Unbound 
project Robert Goodin (2007) has argued in favour of enfranchising all affected 
interests, while the psychologists in the project group, Henry Montgomery and Girts 
Dimdins have carried out an experimental study of egalitarian vs. proportional 
voting, claiming that proportional voting is preferable.9 
                                                 
7 See http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/picola/index.html 
8 See http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/.  
9 See this volume.  
May Thorseth   Deliberation Online 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 5 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 13 
The notion of deliberative democracy pays particular attention to the kind of 
communication involved. Deliberation relates to discursive democracy as discussed 
by John Dryzek (2001), and it is partly based upon Habermas’ idea of practical 
discourse as we have seen. The ethical norm of a free and non-coerced mode of 
communication, free from both external and internal obstructions, is basic. A 
necessary prerequisite is a plurality of parties and opinions, and their accessibility. 
Further, the final arbiter is public reason itself which is the only legitimate authority 
in policy making. From this it follows that not only political decision makers, but any 
public opinion or decision should be exposed to open and critical debate. This is the 
normative basis for the argument of this paper.  
 
Deliberative polling online 
Deliberative polling 
The core idea of deliberative polling is to contribute to a better-informed 
democracy. The method, as developed by Fishkin (1997), is to use television and 
public opinion in a new and constructive way. A random, representative sample is 
polled on the targeted issues. One among many examples is the national 
deliberative poll of the USA on health care and education. Results are also available 
from deliberative polling in different other countries around the world, among 
others, China, Greece, Italy and Northern Ireland.10   
After the first baseline poll, members of the sample are invited to gather in some 
place in order to discuss the issues, together with competing experts and 
politicians. After the deliberations, the sample is again asked the original questions. 
The resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions the public would reach, 
if people had opportunity to become more informed and more engaged by the 
issues.  
 
Deliberative polling online 
The project Public Informed Citizen Online Assembly (PICOLA) has been developed 
by Robert Cavalier.11 It takes its point of departure in the theory of deliberative 
polling as developed by Fishkin. PICOLA is primarily a tool for carrying out 
deliberative polling in online contexts. One objective of this software development 
is to create the next-generation of Computer Mediated Communication tools for 
online structured dialogue and deliberation. An audio/video synchronous 
environment is complemented with a multimedia asynchronous environment. A 
general gateway (the PICOLA) contains access to these communication 
environments as well as registration areas, background information, and surveys 
(polls). The PICOLA user interface allows for a dynamic multimedia participant 
environment. On the server side, secure user authentication and data 
storage/retrieval are provided. Real-time audio conferencing and certain peer-to-
peer features are implemented using Flash Communication Server.  
Mobile PICOLA extends the synchronous conversation module and the survey 
module. The former provides a true 'anytime/anywhere' capability to the 
deliberative poll; the latter allows for real time data input and analysis. And with 
                                                 
10 More information on the method and different trials are accessible at http://cdd.stanford.edu/.  
11 Visit Cavaliers homepage here http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/faculty-cavalier.php. More 
information of the PICOLA project is accessible here http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/picola/index.html 
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real-time data gathering, it becomes possible display the results of a deliberative 
poll at the end of the deliberation day, thereby allowing for stakeholders and others 
present to see and discuss the results as those results are being displayed. The 
interface relations made possible by this technology is of vital importance to the 
deliberative process, as it allows for synchronous conversation in real time. Thus, it 
appears to come very close to offline interface communication. 
Several other reports on online deliberation are discussed by Coleman and Gøtze 
(2001). Some of their examples are drawn from trials of deliberation between local 
politicians and their electors. By and large a main conclusion seems to be that the 
dialogical and responding structure of communication is obtained between the 
parties involved. However, it seems to be a clear tendency that there is a decline in 
deliberation as soon as the period of the trial has ended. Besides, the scope of the 
experiments discussed is of limited/local scope, and thus they are not comparable 
to a global level of communication. 
 
Blogs, storytelling and enlarged thought 
The communication going on in blogs has been characterized by the following 
hallmarks by Coleman and Gøtze:  
 
A blog is a powerful way of telling stories that refer to, and make sense of, the 
documents and messages that we create and exchange in our professional and 
private lives. It is a simply designed and usable storytelling technology that could 
represent the next wave of grassroots knowledge and management 
implementations. Storytelling and blogs share one common ground: grassroots 
interaction (Coleman and Gøtze 2001:34).  
 
The relation between storytelling and blogs is interesting to our discussion, not only 
because of its assumed grassroot interaction, but more importantly because 
storytelling links to reflective judgment and enlarged thought as displayed in Kant’s 
third critique. The idea is that something particular – a story – is given, whereas 
the universal by which it is to be judged, is not given, it has to be found. This is 
how Kant characterises reflective judgment as something different from 
determinant judgment. The openness in the structure of reflective judgment is 
available through the particular.  
If blogs are to promote reflective judgment some communicative requirements 
must prove to be present. The most important, according to the maxim of enlarged 
thought, is to think from the standpoint of everyone else, as we have seen. To the 
extent blogs promote such thought they support the claim of this paper that the 
internet may contribute positively to facilitate modes of communication that are 
associated with the particularity at work in reflective thinking. 
Some critical voices have argued against this positive characteristic of blogs, mainly 
due to a democracy problem. This is because blogs run the risk of being turned into 
chaotic cacophony of voices, a claim put forth by the Swedish media ombudsman 
Yrsa Stenius.12 Her main argument against blogs is that they lack the critical and 
structured kind of dialogues that are urgent if media is to work democratically, not 
least by preventing those in power to choose the problems to be raised. Against 
Stenius it might, however, be argued that the unstructured cacophony might 
qualify even better than structured debates in media because the dialogues in blogs 
are, to some extent, withdrawn from the power relations that are present in media. 
                                                 
12 This is a claim put forth by the Swedish media ombudsman Yrsa Stenius, referred in Lindgren, Lena. 
Morgenbladet June 8 -14, 2007. 
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Even if politicians are not in power in the media, journalists who belong to the 
media definitely are.  
Another argument against the democratic potential of blogs could be that the 
storytelling going on there may not be democratically relevant, nor does it 
necessarily contribute to more enlarged thought. The important question to be 
raised is, however, what kind of topics should be regarded relevant for the sake of 
deliberative democracy. It we look at the questions that are raised in deliberative 
polls, they concern political and public question about for instance health policies, 
traffic or tax regulations, and the like. The topics of some blogs concern similar 
issues, whereas others concern more private issues. Still, I believe the most 
important potential for blogs to promote enlarged thought is due to the possibility 
of telling particular stories to people who do not know for sure what exactly they 
look for when visiting the blog in question. 
 
Virtual and possible judgment online 
When Kant talks about reflective judgment, it concerns possible rather than actual 
judgment. He introduces the concept sensus communis, a public sense and a 
critical faculty that takes account of the mode of representation in everyone else, 
and thereby avoiding the illusion that private and personal conditions are taken for 
objective. By weighing our judgments with the possible judgments of others, and 
by putting ourselves in the position of every one else, we are abstracting from the 
limitations which contingently affect our own estimate. The power of judgment 
rests on a potential agreement with others. Judgments derive their validity from 
this potential agreement. As Arendt has pointed out, judgment must liberate itself 
from the ‘subjective private conditions’ which naturally determine the outlook of 
each individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are only privately 
held opinions, but are not fit to enter the market place, and lack all validity in the 
public realm (Arendt 1968:220). 
A key to understand how this argument applies to virtual realities online is 
contained in the idea of possible judgment. The main reference being made is not 
to some actual context, but rather to something virtual, something it is possible for 
humans to imagine. Second Life is a virtual world online that seems interesting in 
this respect. Visitors set out creating characters, meeting, working and discussing 
in a virtual reality. Maybe the capability for imagining virtual scenarios is even more 
important than polling and blogs. 
 
The problem of the public 
At the beginning of the 20th century Dewey stated a concern about the problem of 
the public (Dewey 1927). Due to political complexity he pointed to a need for 
improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. 
He recognised in particular a need for a better informed public and also for 
legislators and policy makers to become better informed of the experiences of the 
public. Reflective judgment and enlarged thought based in Kant’s third critique 
offers a theoretical framework for dealing with this problem. The liberation of our 
judgments from subjective private conditions is a necessary condition for weighing 
our judgments with the possible judgments of others, by putting ourselves in the 
position of every one else.  
Kant does not offer a model for dealing with the cacophony of voices that Dewey 
worried about, but he does offer a model for transcending the private conditions of 
judgment by different people. On this background we may reformulate the problem 
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of the public in terms of a problem of how to make people overcome the limitations 
that contingently affect our own judgments.  
The cacophony of voices need not be a problem; rather, we believe it is preferable 
for the public domain, not least because it is likely to contribute to more enlarged 
thought, of which the main point is to address a universal audience. New 
information technologies offer possibilities for a far more extended access to the 
cacophony of voices compared to any previous times. The main question, though, is 
what structures are required in order for the public to become better informed. 
Obviously, it does not suffice that there is a plurality of voices available. An 
important hypothesis of this chapter is that the mode of reflection is more 
important than the plurality of voices per se. The solution of the problem of the 
public is first to reformulate the problem: it is not a problem that there is a plurality 
of voices, nor is it a problem that the communication is not sufficiently structured. 
Rather, the problem is how to make people better informed of the limitations of 
their own judgments based on private subjective conditions.  
We believe that internet communication of different kinds – polling, blogs, virtual 
realities like Second Life – contribute to improved conditions for reflective judgment 
due to the following experiences: (1) the public cannot avoid awareness of different 
tastes and judgments, from which it follows that (2) it becomes harder to ignore 
the differences of tastes and opinions of others. From this follows that (3) internet 
activities as mentioned above do have an impact on public reason. Still, there is a 
concern that lack of regulation or structure weakens democracy in the public 
domain. The main problem, related to blogs in particular, was that even if they are 
democratic, they often lack structures for discussion of community affairs, and 
hence there is a risk of a cacophony of voices. Against this conclusion we have 
argued that there is no proof that this very cacophony is a problem. We may even 
envisage a two step procedure towards more organised deliberation: the first step 
starts with increased awareness and openness of the public for instance by 
participating in blogs and virtual realities like Second Life. The next step may be to 
participate in more structured communication, for instance by online deliberative 
polling. 
 
Substantive Judgment Online – Concluding Remarks 
Above we have emphasised the importance of substantive judgment and knowledge 
of particular circumstances in order to evade fundamentalism. Additionally, it is also 
a prerequisite that communication of the particular should contain some universal 
appeal in order to extend beyond the particular context. In this sense global 
democracy presupposes communicative constraints that are not purely formal. This 
has been discussed in view of Kant’s concepts of reflective judgment and enlarged 
thought. 
There are partly diverging reports on the question whether the internet enhances 
the kind of deliberative and democratic communication that has been contrasted to 
fundamentalism above. On the one hand there are reports on the problem of 
filtering and group polarisation, indicating that global communication online 
jeopardises democracy (Sunstein 2001). On the other hand there are also more 
optimistic reports emphasising the importance of global internet communication for 
the purposes of promoting democracy and empowerment (Wheeler 2005). Despite 
such diverging reports, the internet no doubt offers a venue for potentially more 
democratic and less fundamentalist communication between people of diverging 
opinions. Several experiments have been carried out for examining how people 
would deliberate in online polls.13 Others have reported on equally positive results 
in cases of electronic set ups for online deliberation between politicians and their 
                                                 
13 Fishkin (1997) is a valuable reference for this point. 
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electors, but the problem has often been that the good results prevail only during 
the period of the trial, and thereafter a decline of activity has been reported 
(Coleman and Gøtze 2001). 
In concluding I would like to put forth a hypothesis considering how the internet 
might work as impediment against fundamentalist knowledge. This hypothesis 
builds on the anticipation that the internet offers a unique possibility for knowledge 
of particular others across fundamentalist stereotypes. The individual encounters 
between people of very different backgrounds (religious, cultural, ethnic etc.) 
appear to help people see that conflicting norms and moral conflicts are equally 
prevalent within as well as between cultures. An even more adequate way of 
putting it would be that individuals meet individuals and particular stories rather 
than complex cultures. 
Further, if the very encounter between differing individuals and circumstances 
matters more than the differences of the aggregated stereotypes, this matter of 
fact is perhaps more important than the particular content of the communication. 
This indicates that it is perhaps not the democratic ‘content’ of the conversations 
which matters most when it comes to the question of the feasibility of global 
democracy. Rather, I would suggest that the possibility of playing different roles 
and to put oneself in the position of others stimulates the capability of imagining 
counterfactual circumstances. In this perspective we might even consider the 
virtual reality that is offered online as even more valuable for people’s possibility of 
accessing non-fundamentalist knowledge, as compared to knowledge of reasonable 
arguments about democratic behaviour. As an illustration of the kind of virtuality 
we have in mind, there are worlds like ‘Second Life’ where visitors set out creating 
characters, meeting, working and discussing in a virtual reality.14 Maybe such 
acting can prove to be more stimulating for creativity and for the imaginative 
powers that might open people’s minds to appreciate the plurality of forms of life.  
Besides the global potential of reflective judgment due to virtuality, there is also 
another interesting way in which Second Life may be of vital importance to global 
democracy. Lately it has been reported that a virtual political strike has been 
started by Italian IBM employees in Second Life, based on a claim for a rise of 
income.15 9000 employees have urged the (nearly) 9 million inhabitants of this 
world to join the strike. This incident is interesting because the multinational giant 
IBM is one of the companies that have invested most in Second Life. It is, however, 
even more interesting with respect to the relation between the on- and offline 
worlds. The division line seems somehow to disappear when people act in the 
virtual, online world very much as if they had acted offline. The potential for 
political action offline seems obvious through this new communication technology 
tool.  
We need more empirical research to inform us on how internet visitors judge the 
importance of visiting such virtual realities, and whether it has an impact on their 
opinion of global democracy. Meanwhile, I think there are sufficiently strong proofs 
that more people than ever have access to a plurality of virtual and actual different 
others thanks to the new technology offered by the internet. As yet, it is too early 
to know exactly how internet encounters between people affect offline behaviour. 
Public criticism of fundamentalism – e g the banning of the Mohammed cartoons 
recently – no doubt contributes to more diversity of opinions across and within 
particular groups. This example serves as a demonstration of how the new 
communication technology works on a global scale, reminding us that private use of 
reason is hard to maintain through the process of enlarging of thought in the public 
domain.
                                                 
14 Second Life is a virtual 3D world that was established in 2003. This world is developed by its users 
who establish themselves by a so-called ‘avatar’, a virtual figure. The avatar is used for different 
purposes: communication, dancing, shopping, and even striking.  
15 Article by E. Løkeland-Stai in Klassekampen (Oslo, September 25, 2007:10). 
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